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Abstract—The Internet has become a universal communication
network tool. It has evolved from a platform that supports
best-effort traffic to one that now carries different traffic types
including those involving continuous media with Quality of
Service (QoS) requirements. As more services are delivered over
the Internet, we face increasing risk to their availability given that
malicious attacks on those Internet services continue to increase.
Several networks have witnessed Denial of Service (DoS) and
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks over the past few
years which have disrupted QoS of network services, thereby
violating the Service Level Agreement (SLA) between the client
and the Internet Service Provider (ISP). Hence DoS or DDoS
attacks are major threats to network QoS. In this paper we
survey techniques and solutions that have been deployed to
thwart DoS and DDoS attacks and we evaluate them in terms
of their impact on network QoS for Internet services. We also
present vulnerabilities that can be exploited for QoS protocols
and also affect QoS if exploited. In addition, we also highlight
challenges that still need to be addressed to achieve end-to-end
QoS with recently proposed DoS/DDoS solutions.
Index Terms—MPLS, RSVP, DiffServ, QoS, Denial of Service,
DoS, DDoS, Protocol, Performance, Security
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has become a universal communication net-
work tool. It has evolved from a platform that used to support
primarily best effort traffic to one that is now delivering all
kinds of traffic types (including those involving continuous
media traffic such as audio and video. The support of mul-
timedia traffic on the Internet has been an active topic of
research because of their stringent Quality of Service (QoS)
requirements such as bandwidth, delay, etc. It remains a
significant challenge to support traffic with QoS requirements
and simultaneously enable secure transmissions of such traffic
types. It is difficult to overcome this challenge since the
Internet is very susceptible to attacks such as Denial of Service
(DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks.
Indeed, the goal of DoS or DDoS attacks is to reduce the
availability of network resources such as CPU or buffers,
resulting in the disruption of services provided to legitimate
sources. Consequently, DoS and DDoS attacks affect network
QoS and violate Service Level Agreement (SLA) between the
client and the Internet Service Provider (ISP). Such attacks are
major threats to network QoS [1], [2].
Recent security research has focused a lot on privacy or
authentication. Many networking security systems and mech-
anisms are designed to provide more secure infrastructures,
such as firewalls, authentication and authorization protocols,
packet filtering, source identification and cryptographic al-
gorithms. These security methods require extra storage or
computational resources, and the resulting limited resources
become easy targets for DoS attacks [29].
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Figure 1: Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Exchange
Certificates model.
DoS attacks cannot be simply addressed using traditional
security approaches with or without the above mentioned
storage or computational resource issues [29]. For example,
the Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKE) used for key es-
tablishment and Security Associations (SA) parameter used
by IPsec are susceptible to DoS attacks (Figure 1) [3], [29]
since the server has to create states for SA and computes
Diffie-Hellman exponential generation [2], [3]. It is worth
noting that in Figure 1 the Certificate from the client is never
sent, resulting in the Server waiting for a response or re-
initialization of the IKE exchange certificates. According to the
latest data publicly available from Carnegie Mellon’s CERTr
Coordination Center report [7], 21% of organizations which
responded to the survey reported that financial loss caused
by electronic crimes (e-crimes) had increased over the year
(2007). Among the e-crimes, 49% of the organizations had
experienced DoS attacks, which is the fifth most common e-
crime after malicious code crimes, unauthorized access, spam
email and spyware [7].
This work demonstrates that DoS/DDoS attacks are major
threats to network QoS. Although several review papers have
provided various taxonomies of DoS/DDoS attacks, the impact
of such attacks on QoS has not really been studied and inves-
tigated. Indeed, it remains a significant challenge to ensure
and maintain network QoS of different types of traffic while
maintaining secure network infrastructures. In this context, the
main contributions of this work are as follows:
 Many kinds of defensive measures have been proposed
to thwart DoS/DDoS attacks. However many of these
defensive techniques do not take into account the effects
they have on network QoS delivery. In this work, we
investigate recently proposed DDoS solutions and we
systematically evaluate their impact on network QoS.
 In addition to the overview of the each defensive tech-
nique based on their effectiveness on the security, we
will extensively discuss on how it may counteract QoS
provision.
 The vulnerabilities of QoS protocols: Several QoS ap-
proaches and protocols have been proposed and imple-
mented to support Multimedia over networks. Among
them, several traffic engineering technologies including
Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS), Differentiated
Services (Diffserv), and Resource Reservation Protocol
(RSVP) have gained wide acceptance. These protocols,
however, are prone to DoS/DDoS attacks. Therefore,
we will summarize each QoS protocol and thoroughly
describe its vulnerability to DoS/DDoS attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes elementary models of DoS and DDoS attacks. Sec-
tion III presents five basic DoS attack strategies. In Section IV,
various defense measures aimed at preventing DDoS attacks
and their effects on network QoS are presented. In section V,
we identify DDoS attacks that can exploit vulnerabilities of
various QoS protocols. In Section VI, we present future works.
Finally, in Section VII we make some concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND ON BASIC DOS/DDOS MODELS
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Figure 2: Generic DoS model.
According to the World Wide Web Security Consortium
[33], [68] “Denial of Service (DoS) is an attack designed
to render a computer or network incapable of providing
normal services” (Figure 2). DoS attacks accomplish this by
attacking a target computer’s (victim) network bandwidth or
connectivity. With bandwidth attacks, the network is flooded
with a high volume of malicious traffic, resulting in all the
available network resources to be consumed and legitimate
user requests to be denied.
The WWW Security Consortium also defines [33], [68],
“A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack as one that
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Figure 3: Generic DDoS model.
uses many computers to launch a coordinated DoS attack
against one or more targets. Using client/server technology,
the perpetrator is able to multiply the effectiveness of the
Denial of Service significantly by harnessing the resources
of multiple unwitting accomplice computers which serve as
attack platforms” (Figure 3).
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Figure 4: Classical DDoS model.
There are two types of DDoS attacks that have emerged,
the Handler-based and Internet Relay Chat (IRC)-based [4]–
[6], [54]. In the Handler-based model (Figure 4): A handler is a
special program that can be deployed throughout the Internet.
Each handler is capable of controlling multiple agents. An
agent is a compromised system that is responsible for gener-
ating a stream of packets directed toward the intended victim.
Sometimes, the terms “handler” and “agent” are referred as
“master” and “daemon” [54].
The IRC-based model (Figure 5) is similar to the Handler-
based model, but instead of the Handler program an IRC
(Internet Relay Chat) communication channel is employed to
link the client to the various agents. The use of an IRC commu-
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Figure 5: IRC DDoS model.
nication channel allows an attacker to exploit “legitimate” IRC
ports to send commands to the various agents [4], [54] making
DDoS packets more difficult to be identified. In addition, the
client does not need to keep a record of agents because it
only has to log on to the IRC server and check an inventory
of accessible agents [4], [54]. In an IRC-based DDoS attack
architecture, the agents are often referred to as “Zombie Bots”
or “Bots” [54].
One of the network architectures, namely, Peer-to-Peer
(P2P), has been receiving a lot of attention recently. P2P
enables a highly scalable, decentralized, and robust distribution
service for live multimedia streaming applications (such as
Skype used for voice or video) compared to the classical
Client-Server network paradigm. P2P is also prone to DoS
attacks. Typical DoS attacks [76], [77] on a P2P include: a) a
peer stores and retrieves data repeatedly, b) a peer joins and
leaves the P2P network rapidly, c) a peer sends unsolicited
messages to other peers repeatedly, and d) a peer disturbs the
routing information of the P2P network.
III. BASIC DOS ATTACK STRATEGIES
DoS attack strategies can be divided up into 5 categories
[54], [68]. These five categories can be summarized as follows:
1) Network Level: This type of attack is accomplished by
taking advantage of a bug(s), weaknesses in the soft-
ware, or trying to exhaust the hardware resources of the
network. One example of an exploited network service
is the Secure Socket Layer (SSL). The Cisco CSS 11500
Series Content Services Switches [69] when configured
with SSL termination services were vulnerable to DoS
attacks when processing malformed client certificates.
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Figure 6: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
Three-way-handshaking attack.
2) Operating System Level: Exploits the way the operating
system executes its protocol. An example is the Ping of
Death (or Ping Flood) [54], [70]. The attack generates
a large number of ICMP packets (ping) that exceed the
maximum size of 65535 bytes. The victim receives the
ping in fragments and starts reassembling the packet.
Unfortunately, once the packet is reassembled, it is too
big for the buffer and overflows it, resulting in reboots
or the system hanging.
3) Application Level: A bug (running on the target host
(victim)) is exploited at the application level to consume
the victim resources. By exploiting bugs via an appli-
cation, this attack allows an intruder to disrupt services
by causing excessive processing on the target host. One
such example of this is the finger bomb attack which
redirects the finger command to remote sites. In the use
of finger username@@@@@@host1 [71], the @ causes
the finger to recursively finger the same machine (itself)
repeatedly, thereby exhausting all of the resources on
the host.
4) Attacks based on protocol features: This type of attack
takes advantage of the standard protocol characteristic.
For example IP spoofing is used to gain unautho-
rized access to computers by imitating a trusted host
IP address. Another attack is Synchronization (SYN)
Flooding which takes advantage of a flaw in such away
that hosts implement the TCP three-way handshake.
When host B receives the SYN request from a malicious
host, host B must keep track of the partially opened
connection in a “listen queue” for at least 75 seconds.
The malicious host can exploit the small size of the
listen queue by sending multiple SYN requests to host
B, but never replying to the SYN & ACK messages that
host B sends back (Figure 6). By doing so, host B’s
queue is quickly filled up, leading to rejection of new
connections until a partially opened connection in the
queue is completed or the timeout has been reached.
5) Data Flooding: Attempts to oversaturate the bandwidth
or host by generating huge volumes of traffic.
IV. DEFENSE TECHNIQUES AGAINST DOS/DDOS
ATTACKS
There are many kinds of defensive measures that have been
proposed to thwart DoS/DDoS attacks [11]–[29], [51], [52],
[55]–[60], [62], [63], [65]–[67], [72], [74], [75], [78]–[81],
[83], [85], [86], [89], [90], [92]. However, these methods have
not considered the impact on network QoS. In this section
we discuss several defense techniques against DoS/DDoS and
their impact on the QoS delivery over the network.
A. Egress/ingress filtering
Filtering is the process of separating traffic that can be
defined as invalid or inappropriate for a specific part of the
network. This filtering will take place at the entry and/or exit
points of the network. In other words, egress/ingress filtering
is effective in blocking packet with a spoofed1 source address
[29], [59], [72].
While egress/ingress traffic filtering drastically reduces the
success of spoofing, there are potential problems when sup-
porting QoS along with the filtering mechanism.
First, egress/ingress filtering does not preclude an attacker
from using a forged source address of another host within
the permitted prefix filter range. As a result, on large scale
1A DoS attack in which packets are made to appear to originate from a
system other than the one they really originated from.
backbone networks with complex topology, egress/ingress
filtering has difficulty differentiating between incoming traffic
and outgoing traffic. Therefore, the use of filtering is not very
scalable, and this unscalability can affect support for large-
scale QoS. Scalability is not an issue when we need to handle
only QoS traffic inside the egress/ingress filtering. However,
when QoS methods need to be applied outside egress/ingress
filtering, QoS traffic and DoS attacks have to be differentiated
so that QoS traffic to be recognized as legitimate traffic.
Second, networks with filtering routers do not allow a mobile
host to send packets directly from the foreign network to
the correspondent node using its home address as the source
address. To be more specific, traffic to the mobile node is
tunneled, but traffic from the mobile node is not tunneled.
This results in packets from the mobile node which have
source addresses that do not match with the network where
the station is currently attached [9]. To accommodate the
filtering constraint, reverse tunneling was proposed to establish
a correct reverse tunnel from the care-of-address of the mobile
node to the home agent [8]. This reverse tunnel enables packets
to be sent from the mobile node to its home agent. The packet
is then forwarded to the correspondent node after de-tunneling.
Unfortunately, this causes triangular routing in the reverse
direction and it makes current route optimization techniques
become unidirectional or asymmetric [10]. For asymmetric
traffic, filtering methods require extra lookups at the router
table (on the source address), which in turn results in an
increase in delay for QoS traffic.
To take full advantage of egress/ingress filtering technol-
ogy (spoof prevention, compatibility to currently available
protocols, routers, and network infrastructure), we need to
investigate how to apply it while simultaneously satisfying
multiple QoS requirements. Thus, methods to reduce delays,
such as the best possible distribution of filters, rather than
simply increasing filters in a large scale network needs to be
studied, especially in relation to QoS traffic.
B. Firewall
Firewalls provide a defense mechanism that relies on a well-
defined boundary between the inside of the network domain
and the outside network domain. Thus, firewalls mediate the
passage of information. While firewalls can be very valuable
if employed properly, but they are limited in their ability
to protect a network [28], [58]. Firewalls will become less
effective over time as users tunnel protocols through them,
allowing for inadequate security on the tunnel endpoints.
Hence a DDoS attack will be able to target an end node
supporting QoS. If the tunnels are encrypted, there is no way
for the firewall to censor the tunnel or DDoS attacks [28].
To defend against the SYN flooding attack, a firewall may
work as a proxy for TCP connection requests. It may also
act as a TCP connection request monitor that sends a third
message to the destination host to release its resources [29].
Unfortunately, a firewall requires a significantly higher amount
of processing time than routing [30], [31]. Processing time
increases as the rule set increases in length and complex-
ity [32]. As a result, a firewall can easily become a bottleneck
and also becomes susceptible to DoS attacks [29], [32], [57].
These attacks merely delay or prevent legitimate packets from
being processed for legitimate connections, such additional
delays degrade the QoS of traffic ongoing connections. Robust
efficient methods are needed to improve firewall performance
for QoS traffic when subjected to security threats.
C. Honeypots
Honeypot act as a decoy by being placed on a network to
be attacked so that we can monitor how the network is being
compromised from an attack [73], [74]. Usually it consists
of a computer that looks as if it is part of a network but
limits the attacker’s access to the entire network since it is
actually isolated from the network. A honeypot is intended to
entice an attacker to install either handler(s) or agent code(s),
which enables the honeypot to track the behavior of handler or
agent before it presents a problem for the network [64]. The
issue with honeypots is how they can be deployed to detect,
identify, and capture attacks and whether the honeypot should
be placed inside or outside of a firewall. Given that honeypots
are only capable of handling attacks directed to themselves,
sophisticated attackers can easily avoid honypots deployed at
fixed locations on the network [87]. In other words, they can
even attack network QoS with little effort by simply evading
the location where honeypots are deployed.
D. IP traceback
IP traceback methods provide the victim the capability to
identify the actual true source of the packets causing the DoS
attacks [12]. Given the complexity of the current Internet, it
is difficult for the victim to determine the actual source of the
attack because the attacker routinely counterfeits its IP source
address (spoofing). IP traceback is an important concept for
restoring and averting reoccurrences of an attack, particularly
when an attacker spoofs (counterfeits) its IP source address.
Simply discovering the attacker might seem like a narrow
goal, but the essential clues it provides may help discover
the actual attacker [13]. The challenge of IP traceback is to
find an effective and scalable way to track the sources of
an IP packet. Hence the IP traceback should minimize time
that routers spend on tracking and the storage that is used to
keep the tracking information. In this section we discuss four
popular IP traceback methods and evaluate them according to
how they can affect network QoS.
1) IP traceback by Packet Marking: This approach lets the
routers insert additional information into an IP packet so that
the victim is able to deduce the path the traffic has taken
(Figure 7). Consideration of the robustness of this method
needs to be addressed. For example, when the packet marking
is not secure or inadequate, an attacker can generate false
packet markings (also called spoofed marking) [11], [84].
This spoofed marking results in the victim receiving several
false paths, and the victim becomes unable to determine who
is the attacker. To make this method more effective, it is
necessary to reduce the packet size unless we have downstream
fragmentation. A drawback with downstream fragmentation,
however, is that it increases the number of packets into the
network. These packets lead to increased network traffic which
in turn will affect network QoS. If a larger packet size is
allowed instead, it introduces an increase in latency, also
affecting network QoS. Furthermore, packet marking has to be
fast enough to allow for real-time packet marking. Otherwise,
we will likely experience additional delays which will also
impact QoS.
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Figure 7: Packet Marking.
Another proposal to minimize the router overheads is
Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) [12], [84]. This method
includes operations such as node append, probabilistic node
sampling, and edge sampling. PPM does not incur any storage
overhead with routers and the marking procedure (checksum
update) can be easily and efficiently executed at current
routers. Unfortunately, PPM is not scalable. When there are 25
or more attacking sources, path rebuilding takes considerable
amount of time [34]. Therefore, for real-time traffic with QoS
requirements this is not a desired solution.
2) IP traceback by Logging: One solution for tracking an
attacker is to log packets at various key routers throughout the
Internet and use data-mining methods to extract information
to form a path of the attacker [13]. This solution appears
appealing because it allows for precise analysis of the attacker.
However, it requires a large amount of processing and storage
overhead to save the various logs. Sharing the log information
among various ISP, presents a problem of legal issues and
privacy concerns. Probabilistic sampling and compression will
reduce the various logs, but these methods present consid-
erable demands on the network resources [13]. One logging
method proposed is Source Path Isolation Engine (SPIE) [14],
[79]. SPIE only hashes relevant portions of a packet in an
efficient memory structure by means of bloom filters. Overlay
methods also aim to decrease the log, but it presents a burden
on network resources such as bandwidth, processing capability
from the establishment and maintenance of tunnels [11].
3) IP traceback by hashing: To distribute the overhead
throughout the network, hash-based IP traceback [14], [78] has
been proposed. This method consists of the following com-
ponents: Data Generation Agents (DGAs), SPIE Collection
and Reduction Agents (SCARs), and SPIE Traceback Manager
(STM). DGA is applied to each router with bloom filters so
that every router deterministically logs some information about
each packet traversing the router. SCAR is responsible for one
area of the network and is linked to all DGAs inside of its area.
The STM is responsible for dealing with the victim’s requests
and assembling the path information from the various SCARs
(Figure 8).
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When the victim’s Intrusion Detection System (IDS) rec-
ognizes features of the attacking packets, the IDS will report
these features back to the STM (Figure 8). The STM forwards
the request to the appropriate SCARs. The various SCARs in
the STM area collect the data logged by each router having
a DGA. Next, the SCAR reconstructs the attack path inside
its area and submits the path reconstruction result back to the
STM. The drawback of SPIE is that it incurs heavy computa-
tional calculations, distributed management, and storage over-
heads [11]. The computational burden is also distributed over
the network (SCARs and STM) and a high communication
burden is placed on the network bandwidth. Since the victim
is affected by the high communication overheads, its QoS will
also suffer as a consequence.
4) IP Traceback by ICMP: The Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) proposed an ICMP (Internet Control Message
Protocol) traceback technique [16], [86] called iTrace as a
possible DDoS solution. With this approach, when forwarding
packets, a router copies the contents of the packet to a specific
type of ICMP traceback message containing information about
either the adjacent upstream or downstream routers, or both
adjacent upstream and downstream routers. Based on this in-
formation, the ICMP traceback message is forwarded towards
the same destination as the original packet. An ICMP trace-
back message to the destination is generated for every 20,000
packets (Figure 9). The ICMP traceback packet includes the
identity of the router, contents of the packet, and information
about the adjacent routers. During an attack, after receiving
a considerable number of traceback messages, the victim can
identify the approximate source of the attack by tracing the
entire path taken by the attacker from the information received
in the ICMP traceback packets.
The basic idea with this scheme is that every router samples
one of the packets with low probability (e.g., 1/20,000) by
copying contents of the packet into a special ICMP traceback
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Figure 9: ICMP-based traceback.
(also called iTrace) message. The ICMP message includes
information about the adjacent routers along the destination
path (Figure 9). However, there is an assumption that all ICMP
packets are allowed. In fact, it is not the case. Some sites do not
allow ICMP packets through their networks, so the victim may
not receive the ICMP traceback messages. This would result in
no or partial path for them to use to identify the attacker. The
fact that ICMP traceback messages are generated at very low
frequency (1/20,000) (with a high probability of being rejected
at some sites) would cause a degradation in network QoS.
This is because in order to accumulate enough information to
trace the path of the attacking traffic using the ICMP traceback
messages, the victim should receive a fairly large number of
attack packets. If all the packets traveling over the network are
attack packets, a victim needs to receive at least 19,999 attack
packets to obtain one ICMP traceback message. Considering
the fact that ICMP packets are not allowed sometimes, the
actual number of attack packets received will take a long
time to reach 20,000. By the time enough ICMP traceback
messages would have been generated, the QoS of ongoing
network services would have already been degraded.
It should be noted, if each DDoS slave only contributes
a small amount of attack traffic, then the probability for a
nearby router picking the right attack packet can be very
small [15]. The routers closer to the victims tend to have more
iTrace messages (or ICMP traceback messages) forwarded to
them because most of the attack traffic has been aggregated.
The victim probably will get many ICMP traceback messages
from the neighboring routers but very few attackers [13],
[15]. A method proposed to address this problem is called
intention-driven ICMP traceback [15]. The proposed method
adds intelligence to the marking process. This means that
the data obtained for path reconstruction may be promptly
determined by the victim [11]. This is accomplished by explicit
information supplied by the routing table, in which a decision
module would select the kind of packet to use next to generate
an ICMP traceback message [13].
Even with the above proposed method, there are several
attacks on different paths with dissimilar lengths. As a re-
sult, simply using a predetermined marking probability of
1/20,000 for all paths may seriously degrade the network
performances [11], [13].
E. Pushback by Aggregate-based Congestion Control
The Aggregate-based Congestion Control (ACC) method
was introduced to identify and regulate an aggregate traffic
stream at a single router by means of a pushback mechanism.
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Figure 10: Aggregate-based Congestion Control.
The primary goal of ACC is to protect the network and the
rest of the traffic from severe congestions caused by high-
bandwidth aggregates [62], [75]. A router implementing ACC
monitors its level of congestion (Figure 10). When a host is
not the attacker, it decreases its transmission rate. ACC adds
rate-limiting functionality to routers for detecting and dropping
suspicious packets. When the router discovers sustained severe
congestion, it tries to identify the aggregate(s) responsible
for such congestion, using either drop history or random
samples. With this method, the pushback mechanism begins
only when congestion occurs. Actually, the upstream routers
will be notified by the pushback request message to limit the
number of packets destined to the victim to let other legitimate
traffic move because the downstream routers will drop those
packets later anyway. The concept of pushback usually uses
the destination prefix as a congestion signature to distinguish
and protect the legitimate traffic within the aggregate. The
goal is to identify the malicious connections by examining
the destination IP addresses of the dropped packets [62], [65].
When a host decreases its transmission rate, the number
of packets dropped will decrease, resulting in the host being
regarded as a legitimate user. If a large portion of the dropped
packets are identified as having the same IP address, these
packets are considered to belong to the DDoS attack and their
shared destination IP address is used as the attack signature.
Once the malicious traffic is identified, the proposed solution
is to block the malicious traffic [35]–[38]. Unfortunately, the
pushback cannot distinguish between good and bad traffic
going to the destination, and will drop them equally [61], [92].
This could result in the legitimate multimedia traffic being
taken for malicious traffic. For instance, those packets from
hosts that are close to the attackers would also be punished
whether they belong to best effort or multimedia traffic.
F. Authentication
Authentication has long been used in networks to defend
against various attacks. For example, IP Security (IPSec) [39]
provide services such as data source authentication, data
integrity, confidentiality, protection against replay attack, data
privacy, access control, and end-to-end security for IP packets
by means of establishing shared keys between the source
and destination. Hence, various authentication protocols (e.g.
IPSec) are used to verify the identities of the communicating
parties. The integration of authentication protocol to effec-
tively resist network DoS attacks and other types of common
attacks have been proposed [17]–[22], [60].
Authentication based on the public-key infrastructure is
computationally expensive. Cryptographic operations often
involves extensive computations such as the modular expo-
nentiation. Even with the use of cryptography in authenti-
cation to protect against DoS attacks, it is likely to cause
fragmentation (due to the packet changing in size) causing
an increase the traffic load on the bandwidth [40], [41] which
will affect network QoS. When public-key based authentica-
tion is applied, the computation complexity of encryption/de-
cryption consumes time and power [40]. The transmission
and encryption/decryption of credentials can affect several
QoS parameters such as delay, call dropping probability, and
throughput [40], [41].
G. Statistical Analysis
Instead of defending against DDoS attacks by means of
authentication, another method proposed for defending against
DDoS attacks is statistical analysis [23]–[27], [90].
Statistical methods use the characteristic of the packet
header such as IP address or Time-To-Live (TTL) for statistical
calculations. Based on the statistical calculation and measure-
ment, packets which are considered to be attack packets are
dropped. Such methods preclude the traffic distinctiveness that
are naturally constant with standard network processes [24],
[27]. As a result, when a DDoS attack occurs, based on the
traffic distinctiveness and standard network processes, irregu-
lar traffic distinctiveness will be considered to be illegitimate
traffic, resulting in the illegitimate traffic to be dropped by the
filter that guards the victim’s network [44]. An example of the
usage characteristic of the packet is hop-count filtering [25],
[63]. This method relies on the TTL field in an IP packet to
provide information on the number of hops between the source
and destination that are stored in a table with its respective
IP address. When an IP packet is received and there is an
inconsistency with its hop count and the value stored in the
previously built table, the IP packet will be dropped. These
methods depend heavily on assumptions of traffic character-
istics and probabilistic methods. Sophisticated hackers may
use IP addresses with relevant hop count, making this defense
strategy altogether ineffective. Furthermore, these methods
consider only best effort traffic ignoring QoS traffic. For QoS,
the traffic characteristics or the state where the network is in
should be considered. For example, when congestion occurs
on the network, QoS traffic may be routed to less congested
paths, resulting in the number of hops being altered. When
calculating statistics of packet attributes, additional latency
may be introduced if the calculation is complex resulting in
taking more time and power. An end-to-end coordination of
QoS traffic is required for statistical calculations of QoS traffic.
H. Overlay Networks
An overlay network is an isolated virtual network deployed
over an existing network. It is a collection of varies hosts
(originator of the packet sources), routers, and tunnels. Tunnels
are network paths in the underling network, providing links
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Figure 11: Basic CenterTrace Model.
in the overlay network. Overlay networks have received a
lot of interest for addressing DoS attacks because of link-
testing (or hop-by-hop tracing) [13], [56], [80], [91]. Link-
testing is done by testing network links between routers in
order to identify the source of the attacker. A link-testing
method that uses overlay networks is called CenterTrack [51]
(Figure 11). With this method, a particular router called a
Tracking Router (TR) or a group of TRs are used for input
debugging [11], [67]. The input debugging allows the network
administrator to decide on incoming network links for specific
packets [11]. The TR is directly connected to each ingress2
and egress3 edge router of the protected network through
tunnels. Once the attacker is detected, TR is able to locate the
ingress router of the attacker traffic flow since the ingress edge
router may be seen as only one hop away from the TR [11].
However, CenterTrack imposes an overhead management load
on the network resources such as bandwidth and processing
capability, due to establishment and maintenance of tunnels.
This management overhead degrades the network QoS. Cen-
terTrack can determine the ingress edge router being attacked,
but unfortunately, it is incapable of identifying the path only
belongs to its domain [11]. Therefore, it is not very scalable
as the local domain increases. Scalability in the network is
important for QoS, otherwise, QoS method would only work
for certain situations.
A malicious user may send spoofed packets in order to
attack the defense of a node, or can inject attacking traffic
to the overlay network. To avoid such problems, another
overlay network called Secure Overlay Service (SOS) was
proposed. The SOS architecture utilize intensive filtering and
anonymity (“secret servlets”) [52], [55]. A secret servlet node
computes keys for well-known hash functions based on the
site’s IP address. One example is Secure Overlay Access
Point (SOAP), which is a delegated router allowing a packet
to enter the overlay only after its identity is validated [81],
[88]. Hence, the packets must be authenticated and authorized
by the SOS architecture before traffic is allowed to traverse
through the overlay network to the end user. SOS therefore
uses a combination of secure overlay tunneling, routing via
2ingress: is the entry point (label edge router) into the overlay network.
3egress: is the exit point (label edge router) into a network.
consistent hashing, and filtering. However, the insensitive
filtering introduces latency and increases the traffic delays
[52]. The exchange of keys consumes time and power which
affects many QoS parameters such as delay and throughput.
I. Network Forensics
The use of Network Forensics against DDoS attacks is
briefly summarized in this section. Network forensics monitor
network traffic and determine if an anomaly exists in the
traffic, and if so, whether the anomaly can be an attack.
With the use of custom-made sniffers and scripts, skilled
programmers can design a technique to identify the DDoS
attacks. An example of the use of forensics to other areas
includes load balancing and throttling [88]. By applying load
balancing, ISP providers can increase the network bandwidth
of QoS connections which and can prevent QoS from being
affected by a DDoS attack. However, the drawback of such
an approach is that QoS will be degraded if the attack occurs
before the maximum bandwidth is achieved. Throttling is a
method to control the bandwidth that a network application
can use. During throttling, incoming traffic is adjusted to
acceptable levels that can be managed to the server. This
technique may be utilized to mitigate DDoS attacks. Nonethe-
less, currently available technologies cannot always distinguish
between legitimate traffic from malicious traffic correctly.
Further studies are needed to investigate the impact of a
practical implementation of this method.
Other methods which have been applied in forensic anal-
ysis include traceback, event logs, packet sniffers, filtering,
and firewalls [82], [91]. We have already discussed various
challenges associated with these approaches in the previous
sections.
V. QOS PROTOCOL VULNERABILITIES PRONE TO
DOS/DDOS ATTACKS
Multimedia support over networks has been extensively
studied over the last decade. Several QoS approaches and pro-
tocols have been proposed and implemented. However, very
few of these proposed approaches have been incorporated into
commercial products. Consequently, these techniques have
not been widely deployed. However, there are some traffic
engineering technologies that have gained wide acceptance
namely, Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS), Differenti-
ated Services (DiffServ) and Resource Reservation Protocol
(RSVP). In this section we discuss possible DoS attacks that
can exploit some of the vulnerabilities of these QoS protocols.
A. MPLS
To support QoS over IP networks, Traffic Engineering
(TE) has introduced Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS).
MPLS is being widely deployed in the Internet backbone [53].
In MPLS, the packet forwarding process is done by means of
label swapping. Since labels are short and have fixed length,
MPLS can achieve high efficiency compared to conventional
IP routing where the longest prefix matching is used [53].
Similar to IP spoofing attacks, where an attacker fakes the
source IP address of a packet, it is also theoretically possible
to spoof the label of an MPLS packet [42], [89], assuming the
MPLS core network may be trusted. However, one should not
assume that the core MPLS network will provide a level of
security and intrusion invisibility [42]. As the core network is
part of the end-to-end QoS path, protection against an insecure
core is also required. An example of the vulnerability of MPLS
to DoS attacks was revealed by Cisco MPLS router [43].
It is important to prevent theft of services from an Internet
Service Provider (ISP). Therefore, a cryptographic protocol to
protect MPLS header needs to be investigated. For the usage
of cryptographic protocol, it is necessary to ensure that the
protocol will not interfere with the QoS provided by an ISP
on MPLS network. For example, addition of 128 bits to each
MPLS header will result in the header becoming four times
larger. This would add more processing delay for each packet.
Furthermore, the key exchange algorithm also needs to be
aware of the computation burden it imposes since this also
affects QoS [42].
Standard secure protocols (e.g. IPSec), operate at layer 3
(compared to MPLS which operates at layer 2). Many of
the MPLS network designs require the exchange of labeled
packets. This creates opportunities for a third party to intro-
duce labeled packets, which, if correctly crafted, might be
associated with certain Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) on
MPLS networks and could effectively introduce false packets
into a VPN [42]. The design of a Security Label Distribution
Protocol (LDP) is an open issue for future study [42]. In
particular, is defense of privacy or authentication against DoS
attacks require further investigation.
Various attacks can also be launched on layer 2 proto-
col technologies (for instance, Address Resolution Protocol
(ARP) attacks). Since LDP uses the ARP to establish a Label
Switched Path (LSP), ARP spoofing allows an attacker to
redirect traffic between two routers through the device of the
attacker. As a result, the attacker gains access to all packets
between the two routers [42]. When many Label Switching
Routers (LSRs) share a common layer 2 network, a third party
can inject packets into such networks. The label forwarding
method used in MPLS is affected by the vulnerability of MPLS
to DoS attacks such as label spoofing, traffic insertion, and
disabling of the ingress. This, in turn, results in the degradation
of MPLS labels fast forwarding and ultimately degrades the
network QoS.
B. ReSource ReserVation Protocol (RSVP)
ReSource ReserVation Protocol (RSVP) [50] was engi-
neered to accomplish the creation and maintenance of dis-
tributed reservation states across a set of multicast or unicast
delivery paths. The RSVP method allows the reservation of
bandwidth for a path from the sender to the receiver that
meets the traffic QoS requirements. To establish an explicit
route computed by constraint based routing, as well as to
reserve resources along that route for QoS, some kind of path
set up signaling is needed. RSVP communicates with two
basic types of messages, PATH and RESV (Figure 12). PATH
messages flow from a sender to the receiver. Upon receipt
of the PATH message from the sender, the receiver sends an
RESV message in return and reserves network resource for the
path. Maintaining an RSVP path requires the retransmission
of refresh messages. The establishment and maintenance of an
RSVP path use IP datagrams to transport messages between
peers, which is based on UDP instead of TCP. Without
TCP, a peer must handle the loss of distribution messages
by itself. RSVP is a signaling mechanisms, which does not
contain methods to verify that request to conforms to resource
allocation policies (which makes RSVP vulnerable to DoS
attacks) [48], [85] before admitting a flow and allocating the
resources contained in the RSVP message.
SENDER Router A RECEIVERRouter B
Path message holds explicit
route <A,B,RECEIVER>
Generate Reservation
message for required
traffic/QoS constraint
Per hop reservation
and refresh message
unless suppressed
Figure 12: Basic Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP)
Model.
For authorization and identification of the sender or receiver,
one might consider the use of public key cryptography. The use
of public-key-based authentication techniques is, however, still
considered to be too heavy-weight (computationally and from
a bandwidth perspective) to be used for per-flow signaling
[49]. It also requires a substantial amount of processing and
memory requirement which can deplete resources available for
QoS traffic.
The attacker can potentially intercept or drop all or some
of the reservation messages (such that the QoS reservation
ones) and channel establishments can be maliciously delayed
in a persistent way [49]. When RSVP is communicating with
PATH (a PATH message is sent from the sender along the data
path and stores the path state in each node along the path) and
a RESV (a RESV message is sent from the receiver to the
sender along the reverse data path), an attacker can prevent
RESV messages from being sent. As a result, PATH messages
will be sent again, thereby creating additional traffic on the
network which will likely affect QoS of ongoing traffic.
C. Differentiated Services (DiffServ)
Differentiated Services (DiffServ), networks provide QoS
guarantees by policing traffic using a fixed number of pre-
existing classes. DiffServ is a scalable method for providing
QoS to multimedia traffic. DiffServ supports three different Per
Hop Behavior (PHB) as it transport traffic. These PHB traffic
flows are Expedited Forwarding (EF), Assured Forwarding
(AF), and Best Effort (BE). There are methods which have
been explored to defend against DoS attacks while maintaining
QoS by using DiffServ [45]–[47], [66], [83].
[46], [47] proposed resource isolation for TCP ACK, ICMP,
TCP-SYN messages. When a packet arrives, it determines the
type of traffic (BE, EF or AF). Next, the packet is divided into
an UDP aggregate and a TCP aggregate (Figure 13). The TCP
message carries data or control segments (ICMP, ACKs, SYN,
etc). Traffic flows are isolated and the core is not affected by
connection attacks (for example TCP-SYN attacks). However,
the problem with this approach is that once the connection is
attacked, it will prevent other connections from being set up.
In addition, this method does not address the issue when the
attack is on QoS traffic flows in AF or EF classes.
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Another method proposed is differential packet filtering
[45]. In this method, traffic conditions for each incoming
packet are considered safe, normal, or risky according to
a continuously updated history table of trusted IP sources.
When an attack occurs, some of the risky IP packets are
dropped. Next, some of the safe and normal IP packets will
be downgraded or discarded. The differential packet filtering
is a probabilistic method used to determine risky packets.
Unfortunately, it is possible that some of the legitimate traffic
would also be dropped. Such packet loss is unacceptable
for QoS traffic. This method also relies on history tables
which further intensify the amount of processing and storage
overhead required to save history tables.
DiffServ uses the Type of Service (ToS) field in IPv4 and
the Traffic Type field in IPv6 to identify the QoS of traffic.
A malformed packet may set the optional field to some fake
QoS format. As a result DiffServ will exhaust processing
to determine whether it is a malformed packet or an actual
QoS packet [64]. DiffServ also identifies traffic based on IP
addresses. Therefore it is susceptible to another type of DoS
attacks, called IP address attack. In an IP address attack, the
packet has the same source and destination IP address [64].
As a result, it confuses the network/operating system resulting
in a network or user operating system to crash [64] and it in
turn will affect the QoS of network services. Generally, IP
addresses of QoS packets are not protected with encryption
because of the high processing overheads associated with
encryption/decryption, and the exchange of security keys also
consumes time and power which will in turn affect QoS.
VI. FUTURE WORK
The task of mitigating DoS and DDoS attacks and the
configuration of QoS requirements on networks should be
transparent to end-users. This is a highly desirable goal, but
much work remains to make it a reality. As pointed out in this
paper, several issues involved in supporting seamless security
with end-to-end QoS support need to be addressed. Among
those issues include:
Authentication: Data integrity, confidentiality, privacy, and
end-to-end security are important to prevent routing informa-
tion from being compromised. Authentication will affect the
QoS performance. Thus, it needs to be simple enough not to
affect QoS traffic, but advanced and sophisticated enough to
protect against DoS/DDoS attacks.
Logging: Whether it is used for statistical analysis, trace-
back, or filtering, considerations on how many logging tables
and how much information need to be addressed because they
affect the amount of storage required to store such information.
Since network storage resources are limited, smaller logging
tables are required. Having log tables record information make
them also prone to attacks from intruders.
Complex computations (whether statistical analysis or key
exchange) consume time and power to validate the identity of
the user. This issue needs to be addressed in future works. If
unnecessary computations are performed, QoS will be affected
because resources are used instead to perform such tasks. Any
new security method should not increase the size of original
packet nor have complex control message exchange.
Changing the size of packet, which could result in the packet
being fragmented, or having complex signaling protocols,
which takes time to process, will cause greater delays for
QoS traffic due to the decrease in bandwidth because of
the additional traffic load and processing overheads required.
While the network is congested, control messages sent from
the defensive agents may be dropped or lost. This presents
a problem as control messages have to be arrived safely for
most QoS traffic.
MPLS: As mentioned in the previous section, we should
not assume that the core MPLS network will provide a high
level of security and intrusion invisibility 4 [42]. Since the core
network is part of the end-to-end QoS path, protection against
an insecure core is required. The use of cryptographic protocol
with MPLS and current secure protocols (such as IPSec) are
particularly important areas of focus in the future.
Cryptographic protocols are used to prevent theft of ser-
vices. It is necessary to ensure that such protocol will not
interfere with the QoS on an MPLS network.
Standard secure protocols (such as IPSec) operate at layer
3 and not at layer 2 as MPLS does. Thus, MPLS architectures
require the exchange of labeled packets information whether
it is forwarding a label or establishing a LSP. This may enable
a third party to introduce labeled packets, which, if correctly
4Similar to IP spoofing attacks, where an attacker fakes the source IP
address of a packet, it is also theoretically possible to spoof the label of
an MPLS packet.
crafted, could effectively introduce false packets into a VPN
[42]. A secure Label Distribution Protocol (LDP) remains an
open issue for future investigations [42].
Traceback: To accomplish IP traceback, we need to reach
the host where the attack originated. It is not easy to trace
packets through firewalls because the last-traced IP address
might be the firewall’s address. Another drawback to the usage
of traceback systems is that generally traceback methods re-
quire changing the network, as well as adding router functions
and changing packets. Guidelines for dealing with tracing
back an attack packet through various networks are needed
because it infringes on the privacy of those customers paying
for QoS services as well as those not paying for QoS. To
promote traceback methods with QoS support, their effects on
QoS traffic should be taken into account. In addition, further
consideration need to be given to the use of information about
an attacker’s source identified by IP traceback.
DiffServ: DiffServ provides QoS guarantees by policing the
traffic as it enters the network. This is done by classifying and
conditioning traffic to conform to a specific behavior aggregate
based on the Service Level Agreement (SLA) between the
source and the DiffServ provider into a fixed number of pre-
existing classes. An attacker may be able to obtain better
service by modifying the DiffServ field or by injecting packets
to the DiffServ classes. A DoS attack will occur when the
modified or injected traffic depletes the resources available for
forwarding packets. Hence, ingress nodes are the primary line
of defense against DoS attacks. Ingress nodes must condition
all inbound traffic to ensure that the DiffServ codepoints are
acceptable. Packets found to have unacceptable codepoints
must be either discarded or must have their DiffServ code-
points modified to acceptable values before being forwarded.
An important instance of an ingress node is that any traffic-
originating node in a DiffServ domain is the ingress node for
that traffic, and must ensure that all traffic coming from it
carries acceptable DiffServ codepoints. The proposed coun-
termeasure should be combined with other security protocols
if both QoS guarantee and security assurance are required.
This technique allows the DiffServ network to distinguish valid
traffic from malicious traffic.
RSVP: RSVP is a signaling mechanisms, which does not
contain methods to verify the request to conform to resource
allocation policies [48], [85] before admitting the flow and al-
locating the resources contained in the RSVP. This, as a result,
makes RSVP vulnerable to DoS attacks. For authorization and
identification of the sender or receiver, one might consider
the use of public key cryptography. The use of public-key-
based authentication techniques is, however, still considered to
be too heavy-weight (computationally and from a bandwidth
perspective) to be used for per-flow signaling [49]. It requires
a significant amount of processing and memory requirement
and will result in fragmentation thereby allowing DoS attacks.
Trade-offs between performance and security has been a
recurrent theme. As signaling messages are transmitted at a
low rate, the protection of these messages is usually not a
problem. For an RSVP router, even a high volume of messages
does not cause performance problems due to the efficiency of
the keyed message digest routine [49]. It is dynamic key man-
agement that is computationally more demanding, especially
when it comes to scalability. Since RSVP does not state a
particular key exchange protocol, it is hard to approximate
the effort needed to create the required security associations.
Furthermore, the number of key exchanges to be triggered
depends on security policy issues and the authentication mode
used by the key exchange protocol. Hence the greater the
security applied to RSVP, the greater is the impact on the QoS
performance delivered by RSVP. Thus, the security method
used in conjunction with RSVP needs to be simple enough so
as not to affect the QoS traffic, but robust as well to provide
protection against possible DoS attacks.
VII. CONCLUSION
There are many kinds of defensive measures that have
been proposed to reduce the possibility of DoS/DDoS at-
tacks. However, these security techniques have given little
consideration to the performance impact they have on network
QoS. We provided an overview of several defense mech-
anisms against DoS/DDoS and we evaluated their impact
on the QoS delivered by the network. In addition, we also
discussed and presented vulnerabilities associated with popular
QoS protocols that have been proposed (some of which
are already widely deployed in current networks) that are
prone to DoS/DDoS attacks. Each of the DoS/DDoS defense
mechanisms described in this work has its own limitations
when it comes to their impact on network QoS. DoS/DDoS
attacks can seriously affect QoS traffic, thereby breaking the
Service Level Agreement (SLA) between the client and the
Internet Service Provider (ISP). Hence, DoS/DDoS attacks
are major threats to network QoS. It is our hope that the
results of this work will motivate researchers and designers
to investigate novel, comprehensive DoS/DDoS solutions that
not only protect networks and systems but are also able to be
deployed in actual networking environments with negligible
impact on network QoS. Such solutions will lead to adaptable,
secure network systems that can also efficiently support end-
to-end QoS.
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